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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CARRIERS-UNIFORM BILL OF LADING-USUAL PLACE OF DELIVERY.-The plain-
tiffs were consignees of two carloads of lumber shipped under a uniform bill
of lading, not negotiable, by the terms of which the defendant railroad com-
pany was required "to carry (freight) to its usual place of delivery at said
destination." The plaintiffs had previously leased premises adjoining a spur
track which was under the control of the defendant and to which the plaintiffs
had no trackage rights. The defendant had from time to time, as a matter of
courtesy, placed cars consigned to the plaintiffs on this side track for unload-
ing, but because the plaintiff had not paid their freight bills promptly and be-
cause the plaintiffs had permitted piles of lumber to stand too close to the track
so as to make it dangerous for defendant's employees to shunt cars over it, the
defendant refused to "spot" the two cars of lumber on the spur track; instead,
it placed them on its own team track and notified plaintiffs of their arrival.
The plaintiffs refused to pay the freight unless the cars were "spotted" on the
side track adjacent to their factory. Finally, the cars were unloaded on the team
track. The plaintiffs sued for the conversion of the lumber. The defendant
counterclaimed for freight and demurrage charges. Judgment for the plaintiffs
less the freight charges. On appeal, held, judgment reversed. Delivery on the
team track and notice to the plaintiffs is delivery within the meaning of the
bill of lading. The railroad company is entitled to freight and demurrage
charges. McDonald v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Wis. 1936) 266 N.W. 246.
Demurrage is a maritime term now used to designate the right of a carrier
to compensation because of an unreasonable detention of cars in which goods
are shipped. Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909). Deliv-
ery to the consignee at destination is considered a condition precedent to the
right to charge demurrage. Wooley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 150 Wis. 183,
136 N.W. 616 (1912). So, the sole question which arises in the instant case
is: what is the meaning of the term usual place of delivery as it is used in
the uniform bill of lading here under consideration? The court, in the principal
case, starting upon the premige that it is impossible for railroad equipment* to
move beyond the railroad tracks, reached the conclusion that the usual place of
delivery is one of the ordinary facilities or places in the care of the railroad
company so used as a place of depositing goods after transit, that is, freight
depots and warehouses in the case of light freight, team tracks in the case of
heavy freight. Such a place must be one which by its character, location, super-
vision, or care imports that freight stored there will receive protection against
the ordinary hazards to unstored goods. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v.
Davis, 1 F. (2d) 729 (N.D. Iowa, 1924). However, special circumstances may
alter such interpretation of the meaning of the term usual place of delivery.
There may be a special contract between the parties designating a place of deliv-
ery other than the ordinary one, in which case the carrier is bound by the
contract. Gulf Compress Co. v. Alabama Great Southern Ry Co., 100 Miss. 582,
56 So. 666 (1911) ; Erie R. Co. v. Wanaque Lumber Co., 75 N.J.L. 878, 69 Atl. 168
(1908). The consignee may waive his right to have the goods delivered at the
usual place of delivery as he does, for example, when he refuses to receive
freight consigned to him. Central of Georgia Ry Co. v. Montnollen, 145 Ala.
468, 39 So. 820 (1905). Also, where the carrier maintains merely a "flag sta-
tion" and there is no depot nor agent, and there is an express understanding
that such place shall be the destination of the freight, delivery on a siding or
platform shall be considered sufficient. Hill v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 67 Ark.
402, 55 S.W. 216 (1900). Further, if the consignee has knowledge of the place
of delivery, that there is no agent nor depot, then even though there be no
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express agreement, it has been held that an agreement by implication arises and
that delivery on such a side track or platform is sufficient. Soyth and Nortlh
Alabama R. Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 167, 41 Am. Rep. 749 (1880). Supporting a
delivery not made at a warehouse, depot, or team track, the reason is given
that such a delivery is the best the carrier can make under the circumstances
and that such delivery is within the contemplation of the parties. Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Gilimer, 89 Ala. 534, 7 So. 654 (1890). Delivery must also be at a
place where it is suitable and convenient for the consignee to unload before
demurrage charges may be collected. B. & 0. R. Co. v. James Fisher & Son,
5 Ohio S. & C. P. 659, 3 Ohio N. P. 122 (1896). As to delivery by the carrier
upon the consignee's privately owned side track, the courts generally hold that
the carrier has a duty, when the freight is so consigned, to deliver it upon the
private siding before any demurrage charges can be collected. Note (1919) 1
A.L.R. 1425.
ROBERT J. BUER.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-STOCKS OF GooDs TO BE SOLD IN TRADE-FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES.-The debtor was engaged in the retail hard-
ware business. He owed the furnace company $272 on open account for furnaces
and furnace equipment purchased from the company for sale through the hard-
ware shop. Without additional consideration, and at the furnace company's re-
quest, the debtor executed and delivered to the company to secure its open
account a note and a chattel mortgage covering the debtor's stock in trade.
The moitgage was filed within several days. Three months thereafter the
debtor made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The trustees for the
creditors took possession of the store with all the fixtures, book accounts, and
stock of goods, including the property covered by the chattel mortgage. The
trustees refused to recognize the furnace company's claim for preference.
Thereupon the furnace company took possession of the goods covered by the
mortgage, apparently with the trustees' consent, and the trustees began this action,
described as a replevin action, against the furnace company. The case was tried
by the court. The trial judge found that the proceeds derived from the sale of
goods in the course of business had not been applied on the mortgage debt,
that no replacements to the stock had been made by the debtor, and that the
proceeds had been used by the debtor for his own purposes. The court con-
cluded that the mortgage was void as to creditors and ordered judgment for
the trustees for possession of the goods or in the alternative for the sum of
$600. On appeal, held, judgment reversed and a new trial ordered; until it
could be determined that the mortgagee had originally agreed to the debtor's
unrestricted use of the proceeds of sales, or that the mortgagee had knowingly
permitted such use, the security device was not a fraudulent conveyance.
Wyrmelenberg v. Badger Furrnace Co., (Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 718.
A chattel mortgage on a stock of goods to be sold in trade is a precarious
security device. The physical security is disposed of by the debtor in the regular
course of business. Replacements to the stock are after acquired chattels and
a mortgagor cannot mortgage that which he does not have. Chynoweth v.
Tenney, 10 Wis. 397 (1860). Such was the common law rule which has been
changed by statute in Wisconsin as it pertains to stocks of goods to be sold in
trade. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 241.14; cf. (1935) 19 MAR(Q. L. REv. 257. The debtor
and creditor must, however, comply literally with the provisions of the statute
or the security device is void. The mortgage is not merely ineffective against
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